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ABSTRACT 
The Australian baby bonus, offering parents $3,000 on the birth of a child, was announced on 
May 11 2004. The focus of this paper is to analyse the response to the policy across maternal 
age levels in order to separate policy effects from prevailing demographic trends such as 
recuperation of previously postponed births. Using multivariate time series analysis, we find 
that all age groups except teenagers show a positive fertility response to the policy. The results 
suggest that the policy may have elicited fertility behaviour change, evidenced by a higher 
cumulative growth in fertility of maternal age groups 20-24 and 24-30 which is sustained past 
2008 even as a growth in birth ratios of older age groups was stabilising. A short term birth 
timing effect was also estimated to further explore the extent to which incentives matter for 
decisions around family formation.   
Keywords; Baby bonus, fertility, family policy, postponement, recuperation, age specific fertility, 
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INTRODUCTION  
Australia, like most developed countries experiencing below replacement fertility levels, has 
observed a significant ageing of women commencing child bearing and rearing. Fundamental 
changes in society such as rising education and employment opportunities for women, coupled 
with greater access to the contraceptive pill, saw women in the mid 2000’s more likely to be 
having children in their early thirties, as opposed to their early 20’s, as was the case in the 
1960’s (ABS 2012).  The Australian total fertility rate2 (TFR) was also declining over this time 
period and in 2003 the TFR was 1.75, having been below replacement level (2.1) for 28 years 
(ABS 2011).  
Low fertility rates may be a reflection of an inability to achieve desired family size due to an 
array of constraints including financial, work and partner related, fecundity and not necessarily 
“for the lack of wanting kids” (Weston et al. 2004). It is estimated that if couples could achieve 
their desired fertility rate in Australia, the fertility rate would be at, or close to replacement 
(2.1) (Gray et al. 2008; Holton et al. 2011). This gap between observed and desired fertility, 
coupled with governmental concerns about structural ageing provides some rationale for the 
introduction of a birth subsidy policy, reducing financial barriers to desired fertility.  
In May 2004 the Australian Government announced the introduction of a universal maternity 
payment, better known as the baby bonus3. The federal government initially paid each mother a 
lump sum payment of $3,000 for each child born after 30th June 2004, which was increased in 
July 2006 and July 2008 to $4000 and $5000 respectively4. Since the policy introduction 
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Australia has observed a turnaround in the decline in period fertility measures with a TFR of 
1.89 in 2010.  
Extending a baby bonus policy impact analysis presented in an earlier paper by Sinclair et al. 
(2012), this paper uses Victorian  birth data to identify whether there has been any 
heterogeneous response to the baby bonus policy across maternal age groups. In doing so, it is 
possible to begin to separate the policy effects from prevailing demographic trends such as 
postponement and recuperation.  This is important, as recuperation of previously postponed 
births is often cited as the driving force behind the observed increase in the TFR in the years 
following the policy introduction (Parr and Guest 2011).  
The maternal age specific responses to the incentives of the baby bonus are explored using 
Victorian population data, sourced from the Victorian Perinatal Data Collection (VDPC)5 and 
analysed using multivariate structural time series modelling, known as seemingly unrelated 
time series equations (SUTSE) (Harvey 1991).  
BACKGROUND 
Policies that change incentives to childbearing can induce a number of fertility effects. Firstly a 
birth subsidy may increase quantum or level of fertility and secondly it can influence the 
timing of births, inducing ‘tempo’ effects such as recuperation or anticipation. Period fertility 
measures often reflect an interplay between quantum and tempo fertility (Sobotka 2003)6. 
Finally, a short term birth timing effect, where, when possible, parents move birth dates to be 
eligible for the policy payment, has also been explored by Gans and Leigh (2009).  
In the last couple of decades, many OECD countries have experienced changes in fertility 
patterns due to childbearing postponement and recuperation effects, demonstrated by the 
fertility rates of younger and older women moving in opposite directions (D’Addio and d’ 
Ecole 2005).7 Correlation in the decline of TFRs with a delaying of motherhood suggests that 
fertility postponement may be a causal factor of longer term fertility decline. This relationship 
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generations through echo effects. 
7
 There are two components of period fertility: Quantum which is underlying  fertility and tempo which captures 
changes in the timing of births (Testa et al. 2011) 
4 
 
between later commencement of childbearing and completed fertility, depends on the levels of 
recuperation of postponed births. The implications of postponement on completed fertility are 
most severe if postponement leads to foregone births, due to the fact that older mothers face 
higher risks of reduced fecundity, infertility and childlessness (Leridon 2010).  Interestingly a 
study of EU member states by Van Nimwegen and Beets (2009) estimate that a stop in 
postponement would raise completed cohort fertility by 10%. However, the correlation 
between increasing average age at first birth and declining completed fertility does not hold in 
all cases, with countries such as Denmark and France observing later ages to childbearing but 
strong recuperation (Testa et al. 2011; Bratti and Tatsiramos 2010).  
Recently in Europe there are some signs of fertility recovery or stabilisation although there are 
differential effects across countries (Hoorens et al. 2011)8. It is suggested that differences in 
family policy provisions across countries may be driving the differential fertility outcomes 
(Kwalwij 2010). As stated by Hoorens (2011), the extent to which policy has impacted on 
fertility rates in Europe over this period are uncertain, complicated by policy interventions not 
being uniform, and the stabilisation of decline in fertility rates at younger maternal ages 
(Hoorens et al. 2011).Where fertility behaviour is changing, the effects are most pronounced 
for younger age groups. Where behaviour is not changing there will be age specific effects 
driven by the momentum of past changes in behaviour, such as the recuperation of previously 
postponed births (McDonald and Kippen 2007). This importance of identifying an age specific 
policy response is reiterated by  McDonald and Kippen (2007)  who state that “A reversal of a 
trend…. should affect all groups simultaneously but should have a larger impact for more 
recent cohorts” (McDonald and Kippen 2007).   
Microeconomic theory predicts that individuals respond to incentives and thus cash subsidies 
would increase fertility (Becker 1965; Becker and Barro 1988). Underlying this relationship is 
the assumption that parents, in general, make rational choices about the timing and number of 
children they have within a cost – benefit framework.  A subsidy to lower the cost or “price” of 
children would be expected to increase the quantity demanded of children and this would be 
reflected in higher birth numbers.  
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Fertility behaviour is a function of the direct costs of children, but also the opportunity cost in 
terms of loss of income, career progression and or education (capital investment) possibilities 
due to childbearing. The interaction of these social and economic variables is complex, for 
example rising female labour participation rates, less gender specialisation, and higher human 
capital investment and wages for women represents rising family incomes yet a higher 
opportunity cost to childbearing9. Women with strong attachments to the labour force can 
benefit by delaying births to minimize the effect of forgone wages and foregone human capital 
accumulation. Indeed Miller (2009) finds that delay of motherhood leads to increase of lifetime 
earnings of 9% per year, hence higher opportunity costs to childbearing at younger age drives 
postponement (Miller 2009).   
The first contribution of this paper is to identify if Victorian women of different age groups 
react differently or simultaneously to the policy and in doing so separate policy induced 
fertility outcomes from underlying demographic trends such as postponement and recuperation 
effects.  
The second contribution of this paper, is to identify if the policy induced an age specific short 
term birth timing effect. Gans and Leigh (2009) estimate that due to the anticipated 
introduction10 of the baby bonus policy that over a 1000 births were “moved” to ensure 
eligibility for the payment in July 2004 (Gans and Leigh 2009). This parental response to 
economic incentives is observed in the analysis presented in an earlier paper by Sinclair et al 
(2012). In this paper the previous analysis is extended to determine the existence of a 
heterogeneous short run birth timing response to the policy introduction across maternal age 
groups (Sinclair et al. 2012).   
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EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the predicted adverse social and economic consequences of low fertility, primarily due 
to high dependency rates of future generations, governments worldwide have been examining 
policy options to help families achieve their fertility preferences. According to Bongaarts 
(2008) policies will be most likely to succeed if they focus on closing the gap between actual 
and ideal period fertility11. In line with Lutz and Skirbeck (2005), Bongaarts (2008) advocates 
that policies which reduce or reverse tempo effects can have substantial impacts on future 
dependency ratios (Bongaarts 2008).   
Empirically, there is mixed evidence on the impact of policy measures on both the timing and 
quantum effects of fertility. Hoorens et al (2011) in their analysis of European fertility, 
concede that policies can have an effect on reproductive behaviour although individual policy 
effects can be small (Hoorens et al. 2011). The policy fertility causality is complex and 
difficult to quantify especially when comparing across countries where policy, economic and 
social contexts vary (Gauthier 2007). A review of empirical evidence linking family policies 
and fertility by Gauthier (2007) generally finds small positive effects on fertility. Gauthier 
points out the complexity of the fertility decision making process and the resulting need to 
isolate the impact of policies from other possible determinants. Indeed a more recent paper by 
Gauthier and Thevenon (2011) suggests that the impact of policies on fertility is often 
underestimated due to the difficulty in assessing the long term effects.  
Luci and Thevenon (2012) identify a positive effect of “in cash” benefits in the year after 
childbirth when considering the policy of 18 OECD countries from  1982 to 2007. They also 
identify that fertility reacts in a time delayed manner to the changes in the policy environment.  
An often cited paper by Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) simultaneously considers cash benefits 
and maternity leave. Their results found the decision to bear a child was affected by “its direct 
cost which is lowered by the government subsidy, but not by the opportunity costs involved in 
taking time off work”(Gauthier and Hatzius 1997). An earlier paper by Buttner and Lutz 
(1990) examines the fertility impact of a pronatalist policy in the German democratic republic 
in 1976 – a policy aimed at obtaining replacement fertility in the longer term. The dependent 
variables used in this case are age specific fertility rates, and a comparison of fertility rates pre 
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and post the policy indicate that the period fertility rate responded well to the policy.  Policy 
impacts are inferred from the changes in maternal age patterns of fertility. Relative stability of 
maternal ages across parities were interpreted as a signal that observed increases did not just 
reflect anticipation of births which would be offset by subsequent decreases. (Buttner & Lutz 
2010)  
The linkage between financial incentives and fertility in Israel is explored by Cohen et al 
(2007). Constructing an individual level panel data set over the period 1999 to 2005 they test 
the price effect of child subsidy changes (reduction in 2003). The subsidy changes were most 
significant for third and higher parity children and their analysis suggests that policies that 
lower the marginal price of a child are effective in raising fertility over a short time horizon 
(Cohen et al. 2007). Laroque and Salanie (2008) using French data find that fertility is sensitive 
to financial incentives for the first and third births but not so for the second birth.  Other 
positive policy effects were identified by Castles (2003) and d’Addio & d’Ercole (2005) 
analysis of total fertility rates across OECD countries find that fertility rates are higher where 
direct costs of children are lower. Thevenon and Luci (2012) find that while a financial transfer 
in the year of birth has a positive fertility effect, it is not the most effective policy lever.   
A policy implemented in the Canadian province of Quebec between 1986 and 1997 that paid 
families up to $8,000 for having a child12 provides a natural experiment in fertility choice and 
has been the topic of a number of empirical studies. This policy like the Australian baby bonus, 
was a generous universal cash payment, however it differed in that the payment increased 
across parities. Milligan (2005) finds evidence that the policy achieved its goal of increased 
fertility and attributes 93,000 births to the policy over the ten year period. Preceding Milligan 
(2005), Duclos, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2001) find that family benefits do have an effect on 
fertility rates, in particular providing strong incentive to give birth to a third child in Quebec.  
There has yet to be a detailed study of the effect of the baby bonus on Victorian fertility choice 
in particular across age, however there has been much academic interest in the Australian 
policy outcomes.  
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Drago et al. (2010) make use of HILDA13 household panel data to assess if the baby bonus 
increased fertility intentions and thereby births, and if the effects were temporary or sustained. 
Their analysis included variables that capture the opportunity cost of birth such as labour force 
status, education and income. They found that fertility intentions rose after the announcement 
of the Baby Bonus, and the birth rate was estimated to have risen modestly as a result.  
Risse, (2010) also analysing HILDA data finds that the baby bonus positively affects 
household fertility intentions. Interestingly, this effect is particularly pronounced for women 
aged 25 to 34 when compared to other age groups in the year of the policy introduction. In the 
subsequent years 2005 and 2006, intentions rise for those women aged 25-44 however annual 
fluctuations in growth of childbearing intentions are observed across age categories.  
Regional specific impacts of the policy have been analysed for NSW (New South Wales) and 
WA (Western Australia). However, the papers of Lain et al (2009) using NSW data  and 
Langridge et al (2010) in WA found conflicting effects on maternal age specific fertility. In 
NSW (Lain et al. 2009) the largest change relative to the pre policy trend in births was found to 
be teenagers, although proportionally the largest increase was in those women aged 30 and 
over, whilst in WA, Langridge et al. (2010) find no significant difference in response across 
maternal age groups.  
Gans and Leigh (2009) have analysed the short term birth timing effects of the introduction of 
the policy. Illustrating that economic incentives matter for fertility related decision making, 
they conclude that up to 1,000 births (primarily discretionary caesareans) may have been 
delayed as a result of the introduction of the baby bonus.  Based on similar analysis of the 2006 
baby bonus increase, they conclude approximately 600 births were delayed in this instance 
(Gans and Leigh 2007). Other examples of short term birth timing effects induced by policy 
related economic incentives include Tamm (2009), Neugart and Ohlsson (2012), and Kuhn and 
Brunner (2011). 
While the aforementioned research demonstrates empirical evidence of a positive impact on 
fertility, a paper by Parr and Guest (2011) raises questions about the co-incidence of 
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Australia’s observed fertility increase and policy initiatives14. The authors attempt to 
disaggregate family policy effects from socio demographic trends and stress that Australia’s 
increase is not unique in the context of other OECD countries15. They suggest that the 
contribution of the baby bonus to increased fertility has been small and that a range of socio 
demographic variables such as the interaction of age and parity, primarily structural tempo 
distortions, but also education, marital status, income and occupation were more significantly 
impacting on fertility (Parr and Guest 2011). 
DATA AND METHOD 
 The data used is Victorian perinatal data from January 1983 – December 2008. Victoria is 
Australia’s most densely populated and urbanised state, with an estimated population of 5.6 
million in 201216. It is among the fastest growing and more diverse societies in Australia (ABS 
2012) and has been subject to postponement transition17. Data was sorted according to 
maternal age, and births ratios were generated using Victorian population estimates for women 
aged between 15-44 (ABS 2010). The age specific birth ratios18 (ASBRs) are categorised 
according to the following age groups:  15-19, 20-24,25-29, 30-34, 35-39,40-44 .  
The times series generated are shown in Figure 1: Age specific Birth Ratio’s – Victoria 1983 – 
2009 
 
 
          FIGURE 1: VICTORIAN AGE SPECIFIC BIRTH RATIO’S 
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 Defined as the monthly number of births to women if a particular age group per 1000 women of that age 
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10 
 
 
Source: VDPC Perinatal Birth data AND ABS estimated Victorian annual population data. Cat: 310104 2009. 
*Note the ASBR is calculated as the number of births to women of a given age category as a proportion of 
estimated female population in that age category. 
 
By visually inspecting the series a few key features can be noted post the policy introduction. 
Firstly there is a general downward trend in teenage births over the period and this does not 
appear to change post July 2004. Also it can be observed that there is a general upward trend in 
those women having children aged 40 and over but this trend does not appear to change greatly 
after the baby bonus introduction. Following the policy introduction on July 2004 the decline 
in the births per 1000 of women aged 20-24 and 25-29 appears to stabilise. Historically we can 
observe a growth in the trend of the series relating to women aged 30-34 but post 2004 this 
growth appears to strengthen. 
11 
 
To give a general overview of Victorian fertility trends, the TFR can be calculated using the 
generated age specific births ratios.  
FIGURE 2 VICTORIAN TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 
 
Source: The TFR as shown here is generated using ASBR calculated from VDPC perinatal data. 
 
Following the policy introduction in 2004 an increase in the Victorian TFR can be observed. 
However, the TFR has limitations because if women are progressively giving birth at older 
ages the TFR measure will be too low and if this postponement is slowing it may result in 
period TFR measures which are too high (Ni Bhrolchain 1992).  
To formally test the age specific impact of the baby bonus a multivariate state space model is 
employed. The model is referred to as seeming unrelated time series equations (SUTSE), a 
multivariate generalisation of standard structural time series models.  For a N-vector of age 
specific birth rates at time t, denoted as yt, the model takes on the form: 
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Equation 1 is often referred to as the observation equation whereas (2a-c) are denoted as the 
component or state equations. The inter-relationships are captured through the NxN variance 
covariance matrixes denoted as ∑ (Harvey 1991). 
This is an extension of the modelling technique applied in Sinclair et al. (2012) and while one 
could simply model each ASBR series individually, by extension to a multivariate analysis the 
dynamic interactions between the series can be captured.  
The bolded characters denote N-Vectors, here N denotes the number of the series. In particular 
yt denotes a vector of observations at time t (for example age specific monthly birth ratio’s). 
The term Zt denotes a set of explanatory variables, while Xt represents the set of policy 
intervention variables at time t.  The terms tt βµ ,  and tγ  denote vectors of trends, growth and 
seasonal rates at time t.  The association between the series is captured by the off-diagonal 
elements of the various (NxN) ∑  matrices. The trend (equations (2a) and (2b)) is made up of 
two components, 1−tµ  and 1−tβ , where tβ  captures the growth rate in the series and 1−tµ
 
the 
level. The seasonal component is captured in equation 2c. Both disturbances (εt, and   ηt,) are 
assumed to be normally disturbed with a zero mean and constant covariance matrix.  The 
disturbances are assumed to be strictly independent (Koopman et al. 2006). 
The coefficients Θ and Φ measure the direction and size of the explanatory and policy 
intervention variables respectively. By including a set of policy intervention variables it is 
possible to measure the departure from the underlying trend19 in fertility rates coinciding with 
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the introduction and subsequent modifications in the baby bonus policy (see Table 1 for a 
timeline of significant policy events which informs policy intervention dates). 
TABLE 1 TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
11 May 2004  Announcement of the introduction of the baby bonus policy 
1 July 2004 Policy introduced – $3,000 (indexed to inflation) 
1 July 2006 The baby bonus increased to $4,000(indexed to inflation) 
1 January 2007  
All mothers under the age of 18 received the payment in 13 equal 
instalments 
1 July 2008  
The Baby bonus increased to $5,000/ paid in 13 equal instalments to 
those less than 18 and a means tested ceiling of combined annual 
income of $150,000 or $75,000 in the 6 months post the birth of the 
child. 
1 July 2009  Means tested baby bonus paid to all families in 13 equal instalments 
Source: FaHCSIA – Family Assistance Guide: Chapter 1.2 version 1.1.55 (2012) 
 
The approach stated above can measure structural changes in the  ASBR series that correspond 
to the policy introduction while controlling for other determinants of fertility choice. While it is 
difficult to identify a counterfactual, particularly when there may be certain demographic 
changes which may or may not be influenced by the policy, a consideration of changes in the 
age specific birth does assist in separating policy effects from prevailing demographic trends 
such as recuperation of previously postponed births (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012). 
Furthermore, while a natural age cap on fertility may cause the postponement process to slow, 
this would be reflected in incremental changes in the ASBR series being modelled. The 
methodology used to capture structural changes induced by baby bonus will model the 
changing fertility behavioural patterns in the underlying trend.  
Two models are developed and tested. The first tests a series of policy specific impulse 
intervention variables which capture any discretionary change in the timing of births around 
introduction, increments or change in payment format.  Changes in the trend in any of the 
14 
 
ASBR series i.e., in the level and or slope will be captured by intervention or impulse variables 
in the state equations. The second model will extend the analysis to include explanatory 
variables to capture fluctuations in economic conditions, expectations and the structure of the 
labour force.  
In the first model, age specific birth ratios are the dependent variables. Age specific fertility 
effects are captured by extending the methodology used in Sinclair et al (2012). A structural 
break in the level of the series is tested for in March 2005 approximately ten months post the 
policy announcement. The national debate surrounding the baby bonus introduction served to 
heighten the impact and awareness of the policy to the general public. The combination of 
ongoing media discussion and also the potential of a social multiplier effect, could result in 
more delayed effects, therefore a growth in the series is tested in January 2006. It would seem 
reasonable to expect that some of the growth in the series may slow as the initial informational 
impacts and the initial rise in births from changed tempo effects slowed (bringing forward of 
births) and so a change in the cumulative  growth of the ASBR  series is tested for in January 
2008 . 
The impulse variables relate to the birth timing effects identified by Gans and Leigh (2009). 
The relevant dates are June 2004 and July 2004. As the policy has been modified on several 
occasions (the first of these was an additional increment of $834 on July 1 2006 bringing the 
Baby bonus to $4,000) impulse variables in June and July 2006 are also modelled for each age 
group.  
The analysis extends the Gans and Leigh model to identify if there are any age specific short 
term birth timing responses. Due to concerns about teenage mismanagement of funds, in 
January 2007 the baby bonus was changed from being paid in a lump sum to being paid in 
instalments for teenagers.    Given the change in incentives, impulse variables are included in 
the model in December 2006 and January 2007 to capture any short run changes to timing of 
births for the teenage age group only. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
TABLE 2: RESULTS MODEL 1 
Table 2     Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics
Age specific birth rate (ASBR) ASBR <19 ASBR 20-24 ASBR 25-29 ASBR 30-34 ASBR 35-39 ASBR 40-44
 (births per 1,000 females of given age category)
Dependent variable Co-eff(p)
Outlier 2004(6) 0.02 -0.43** -0.07  -0.43 -0.39** -0.05
(0.80)  (0.04) (0.80)  (0.12) (0.04) (0.46)
Outlier 2004(7) -0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.54* 0.47** 0.12*
(0.25) (0.95) (0.77) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06)
Outlier 2006(6) 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.18 -0.10 -0.00
(0.88) (0.79) (0.78) (0.52) (0.60) (0.93)
Outlier 2006(7) -0.07 0.04 0.18 0.40 0.06 0.13**
(0.38) (0.81) (0.55) (0.16) (0.75) (0.04)
Outlier 2006(12) 0.02
(0.79)
Outlier 2007(1) -0.09
(0.26)
Level break 2005(3) -0.008 0.18 * 0.42** 0.43** 0.45*** 0.06**
(0.87) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Slope break 2006(1) 0.001 0.02*** 0.02** -0.00 0.01* 0.006*** 
(0.72) (0.00) (0.04) (0.63) (0.09) (0.00)
Slope Break 2008(1) 0.003 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03* -0.04*** 0.00
(0.66) (0.24) (0.20) (0.09) (0.00) (0.49)
Normality * 2 0.52 0.93 1.98 15.83 2.31
Heteroskedasticity ( 2 sided F test) 0.505 0.72 0.59 1.64 2.1 1.63
   (distributed as  F(h,h ), with df=96
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.91 1.91 1.77 1.92 1.91 2.16
Piortmanteau Box-Ljung Q-statistic 25.11 19.81 28.71 36.16 22.18 28.65
R2 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.59
* p=0.10; ** p=0.05; *** p=0.001
*The critical value for the Normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (c22; Koopmans et al 2006, 201) thus indicating the 
residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin Watson is 0.41 which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey 1990).
  
Fertility choice effects of the policy were initially modelled by fitting a structural break to the 
level of the ASBR series approximately 10 months after the policy announcement. The fertility 
response to the policy (as captured by the level break in 2005) is positive and consistent across 
all maternal age groups, except teenagers. As discussed above, McDonald and Kippen (2009) 
state that in order to identify behavioural change with respect to fertility choice, a policy would 
need to have an impact across all groups, with a stronger effect on those in the younger age 
groups. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that there is a significant positive 
structural break in the level of the series for women aged less that 30 (except teenagers).  The 
suggestion that the policy has driven behavioural change is therefore supported by the positive 
cumulative growth in birth ratios for these younger groups, the coefficients of which are 
greater than that of older age groups. The results above suggest that the policy may have 
elicited behaviour change and may have acted as a catalyst in slowing of postponement. A 
slowing of postponement is a key factor in stabilising fertility levels.  
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A clear pattern of change is also shown for the age groups over 30. Older maternal age groups 
exhibit a positive response to the policy, and a significant positive shift in the level of the series 
is observed. The coefficient representing births to those women aged 40-44 is smaller than that 
of the younger age groups but this may be due to the fact that although the fertility intentions 
may have increased in response to the policy,  fecundity constraints maybe reduce the 
probability of a positive outcome or birth. It is interesting to note that there is a slowing of 
growth in the birth ratios of older mothers that is not observable in the younger age groups 
after 2008, so the cumulative growth in total birth ratios during this period is driven by births 
to women in younger age groups.  
Although it is difficult to establish an exact counterfactual, any slow moving changes in 
demographic patterns are incorporated into the trend analysis and therefore the methodology 
ensures that the policy intervention variables capture effects over and above slower moving 
demographic trends.  Unless the move to an end to postponement is sudden and exactly 
contemporaneous to our policy intervention dates we can interpret the findings above as policy 
induced 
The short term birth 2004 introduction effect exhibits some heterogeneity in response across 
maternal age.  This discretionary birth timing effect is found to be most significant in the older 
age groups particularly those women aged 35-39. An abnormal increase in births is observed in 
July for all maternal ages over 30. Although these increases are matched by a significant 
decrease in June for the 35-40 year old only, negative signs are observed on the coefficients of 
both the 30-34 and 40-44 age groups.  
These results would concur with the notion that women in these age groups are most likely to 
have higher rates of scheduled caesarean sections20 and private health care cover and thus may 
have more discretion around the timing of births. Interestingly a significant decline in June 
2004 is observed for women aged 20-24 but again not matched by a significant simultaneous 
increase in July.21 The incremental rise in the baby bonus in July 2006 by $834 appears not to 
                                                             
20
 A population study of Victorian women has found that older women are found to be associated with higher 
risk of caesarean delivery (Biro et al. 2012). 
21
 The rate of caesarean section in Australia exceeds 30%, according to a study by Robson et al. in 2009 maternal 
request is an important contributor to these rates (Robson et al. 2009). In 2009  27.7% of women admitted as 
public patients and 38.9% of those admitted as private patients had caesarian sections. 
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have affected birth timing although there was an increase in births to women aged 40+ in July 
2006. 
ECONOMICS VARIABLES 
Given the motivation for this paper is to identify age specific effects of the policy, economic 
variables are added to the model to control for the possibility that the generated results could 
be impacted by non-policy related economic factors.  Although the analysis present in Sinclair 
et al (2012) finds that the economic variables were not significant across the total population, it 
may be that disaggregation across age groups show differing results on the sensitivity of 
fertility choice to economic circumstances. 
To establish if the results from model 1 are robust, a second multivariate model is run subject 
to inclusion of  unemployment and labour force participation variables but also Victorian 
specific household sentiment variables (as captured by the Westpac consumer sentiment 
index)22. Note the Victorian specific CSI data is only available from 1996. A quarterly 
conversion of the data to test GDP or state final demand is also modelled. It was found that the 
results in model 1 are robust and, in particular the level break in 2005 strengthens across age 
groups (except for teenagers and those aged greater than 40). The results also hold for the 
quarterly conversion to control for GDP / state final demand23.  
CONCLUSIONS 
An increase in fertility rates have been observed following the introduction of the Australian 
baby bonus in 2004. An analysis of age specific birth ratios goes some way to disentangle the 
policy effects from prevailing demographic trends such as recuperation of previously 
postponed births   
The results show that all age groups except teenagers showed a positive fertility response to the 
policy. Behavioural change is evidenced by a higher cumulative growth in fertility of maternal 
age groups 20-24 and 24-30 which is sustained past 2008 even as a growth in birth ratios of 
older age groups was stabilising. The results suggest that the policy may have elicited fertility 
                                                             
 
23
 Refer to the appendix for the co-efficient estimates and diagnostics 
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behaviour change and acted as a catalyst for an end or a slowing of postponement which has 
long term positive implications for population growth. 
This research helps to determine the effectiveness of the policy assuming a pronatalist policy 
motivation, but also it should be noted that a differential impact across maternal age groups 
may have broader policy implications. In addition to controlling for demographic trends and 
birth timing effects, analysis of age specific impacts of the policy gives some insights into the 
“welfare implications” and potentially unintended consequences of the policy. If the baby 
bonus was found to have an impact on maternal age at birth, this can have implications for 
child and maternal health (Biro et al. 2012)  
 One limitation of this analysis is that, although it is observed that there is an increase in births 
to younger mothers, and not simply older mothers recuperating previously postponed births the 
issue of parity is ignored. Research is needed to further determine the impact of the baby bonus 
and whether it encouraged women to commence childbearing earlier without a change in 
cohort fertility.   
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APPENDIX – RESULTS ECONOMIC CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 3   Coefficients controlling for economic fluctuations
Age specific birth rate (ASBR)
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
Monthly 
Dependent variable Co-eff(p)
Outlier 2004(6) 0.02 x -0.43** -0.46** -0.07 x    -0.43 x -0.39** -0.31 -0.05 x
(0.8) (0.04) (0.01) (0.80) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.46)
Outlier 2004(7) -0.09 x -0.01 x 0.08 x 0.54* 0.69** 0.47** 0.36* 0.12* 0.10
(0.25) (0.95) (0.77) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.18)
Outlier 2006(6) 0.01 x -0.05 x 0.08 x -0.18 x -0.10 x -0.00 x
(0.88) (0.79) (0.78) (0.52) (0.60) (0.93)
Outlier 2006(7) -0.07 x 0.04 x 0.18 x 0.40 x 0.06 x 0.13** 0.12
(0.38) (0.81) (0.55) (0.16) (0.75) (0.04) (0.10)
Outlier 2006(12) 0.02 x
(0.79)
Outlier 2007(1) -0.09 x
(.26)
Level break 2005(3) -0.008 x 0.18* 0.18** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.43** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.06** 0.02 
(0.87) (0.08)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.34)
Slope break 2006(1) 0.01 x 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02** 0.01 -0.00 X 0.01* 0.01 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.72) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (.19) (0.63) (0.09) (0.11)  (0.00) (0.00)
Slope Break 2008(1) 0.003 x -0.02 x -0.03 x -0.03* -0.03 -0.04*** -0.03* 0.00 x
(0.66) (0.24) (0.20) (0.09) (0.32) (0.00) (0.07) (0.49)
Consumer sentiment index Victoriaa -0.002* x -0.01*** x x 0.001**
(0.05) (00) (0.04)
Victorian Female Unemploymenta x x x x x x
Female Participation ratea x 0.06* x x x x
(0.07)
Male unemployment ratea x x x x x x
Normality 2 2.01 0.52 1.54 0.93 1.16 1.98 3.07 15.83 6.74 2.31 3.23
Heteroskedasticity ( 2 sided F test)b  
0.505   
H (96)   
0.7        
H (40)  
0.72     
H (96)  
0.64     
H (40)  
0.59    
H (96)  
0.85    
H (40) 
1.64     
H (96) 
1.01     
H (40) 
2.1       
H (96) 
1.69    
H (40) 
1.63     
H (96) 
1.47      
H (40) 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.91 2.22 1.91 1.89 1.77 1.78 1.92 2.07 1.91 1.99 2.16 2.33
Portmanteau Box-Ljung Q-statistic 25.11 18.15 19.81 29.48 28.71 25.64 36.16 31.29 22.18 31.96 28.65 29.32
R2 0.45 0.58 0.48 0.58 0.43 0.5 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.6 0.59 0.67
a
 all explanatory variables are lagged 12 months
b Value in brackets indicates the degrees of freedom for the different models.
* p=0.10; ** p=0.05; *** p=0.001
ASBR 35-39 ASBR 40-44ASBR <19 ASBR 20-24 ASBR 25-29 ASBR 30-34
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
Model 2 Model 2 
* The critical value for the Normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (c22; Koopmans 
et al 2006, page 201) thus indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin 
Watson is 0.41 which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).
Model 2  (births per 1,000 females of given 
age category)
Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 
NA
NA
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Table 4     Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics
Age specific birth rate (ASBR) ASBR <19 ASBR 20-24 ASBR 25-29 ASBR 30-34 ASBR 35-39 ASBR 40-44
 (Quarterly births per 1,000 females of given age category)
Dependent variable Q (ASBR) Co-eff(p)
Outlier 2004(2) -0.13 -0.71* -0.05 -1.33** 0.03 -.09
(0.45) (0.07) (0.92) (0.02) (0.92) (0.39)
Outlier 2004(3) -0.15 0.04 0.18 0.35 0.33 0.16
(0.42) (0.91) (0.76) (0.54) (0.41) (0.15)
Outlier 2006(2) 0.27 -0.23 -0.27 0.41 -0.66* 0.18
(0.14) (0.54) (0.65) (0.49) (0.10) (0.12)
Outlier 2006(3) 0.09 0.45 0.45 1.30** 0.91** 0.25**
(0.59) (0.23) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Level break 2005(1) -0.07 0.33 0.99* 0.75** 1.16*** 0.11*
(0.63) (0.27) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) 0.07
Slope break 2006(1) 0.01 0.16** 0.24** 0.12* 0.16*** 0.05***
(0.60) (0.00) (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) (0.00)
Slope Break 2008(1) 0.02 -0.18 -0.39* -0.42** -0.38*** 0.03
(0.65) (0.16) (0.08) 0.03 (0.00) (0.34)
State Final Demand % change 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.35) (0.45) (0.34) (0.85) (0.51) (0.81)
Normality * 24.15 0.56 1.69 0.17 0.02 1.58
Heteroskedasticity H(22) 0.78 0.83 2.09 1.16 1.69 1.63
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.28 2.09 2.17 2.03 2.21 2.94
Portmanteau Box-Ljung Q-statistic Q(q,q-p)8.68 11.75 12.90 12.40 7.90 49.00
R2 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.57 0.62 0.71
* p=0.10; ** p=0.05; *** p=0.001
*The critical value for the Normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (c22; Koopmans et al 2006, 201) thus 
indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin Watson is 0.70 which indicates autocorrelation is not 
 
 
 
 
 
